- Federalist #10
- Madisons Thesis In Federalist 10 – 727555
- An Analysis of Federalist Papers 10 and 51
- Federalist #10 - James Madison - Federalist Fridays
To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. The first is impossible. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence.
The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions. The framers established a representative form of government, a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws cannot possibly control factious conflicts.
This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite might happen. Men who are members of particular factions, or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people.
However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens.
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- James Madison.
- FEDERALIST No. 1. General Introduction!
This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob. In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. If the framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union.
Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capitol, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.
Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state.
Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic was set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor.
Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute and irresponsible state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security.
He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to guarantee both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in the Philadelphia Convention.
His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in , was certainly based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in But Madison's greatness as a statesmen rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience in the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations. His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests could be made a guarantee of stability and justice under the new constitution.
When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in , that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay Hume disclaimed any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise.
And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world. The Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world.
At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic. In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. The only evidence is one from parsimony. He served as editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics from through About the Author.
The internal evidence from the Federalist is merely circumstantial, but the external evidence, from other writings and speeches by Madison in , is conclusive. Madison developed four different iterations of the same argument in that year, of which Federalist No. In March and April of , Madison was first developing his theory of the extended republic. The second iteration of the argument was during the opening weeks of the Constitutional Convention, on June 6.
Madisons Thesis In Federalist 10 – 727555
That argument was given in reply to a speech by Roger Sherman, who had said that the purpose of a federal government were very limited in scope. Interferences with these were evils which had, more perhaps than any thing else, produced this Convention. Once again, the June 6 speech does not name the federal veto explicitly as the solution, but there was nothing else the Convention had discussed by that point which could possibly have had the effect of curbing injustices in the states. I agree with Michael Zuckert, who argues that the June 6 speech does not make any sense except as a prelude to what would happen two days later: Charles Pinckney would move to expand the scope of the federal veto, and Madison would second the motion.
Most conclusive of all is the third iteration of the argument. On October 24, Madison wrote a letter to Jefferson, who was then in Paris. The ostensible reason for the letter was to apprise him of the happenings from the Constitutional Convention, which had just concluded the month before. But this proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment. Almost exactly one month later, Federalist No. It recycles the same argument, but applies it to a new end: securing good legislation in the national councils.
The awkward shift can perhaps be seen in the wording of the Federalist essays, but it is obvious when examining the external evidence. Willing people collaborate for civic integrity and elect leaders to execute developed statutory justice. Everything important to a civil USA springs from the agreement that is offered in the preamble.
Then from elites forming the Continental Congress to the ratification of the Treaty of Pairs, which admitted to 13 free and independent states by name: 13 names for 13 constitutions some not written. The Signers specified radical break from both Blackstone common law and Canterbury theism, a Chapter XI Machiavellian partnership with politicians. So-called founders continued to exert factional powers and tainted the work of the Signers by demanding a Bill of Rights—a partial return to English rule. Madison is a Signer, but in my opinion a weak citizen. Substantially due to the organizational brilliance of Saul Alinsky, the past five decades have been dominated by what I call Alinsky-Marxist organizers AMO.
Only a civic people can defeat the AMO push to replace the civic order of the American republic with a chaotic social-democracy. The proposal has momentum based on AMO style sensationalism and attacks on persons with opposing opinion and expression.
An Analysis of Federalist Papers 10 and 51
Facebook stopped the offender after my report. At best, unanimous jury decisions is a relic of obsolete English debates. In Supreme Court cases regarding the Louisiana rule, originally , the court has said the USA requires states to provide impartiality rather than unanimity and have upheld the rule. Further, with one committedly biased juror, supermajority is required and with 2 biased jurors, is required, again, theoretically.
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Thank you. I appreciate Prof. Rogers for sharing his concerns and independent theory in time for my current study. The supermajority enhances the impartiality of a 12 person jury in criminal trials. The proposal has momentum based on AMO style sensationalism and attacks on persons who express opposing opinion. At best, unanimous jury decisions is a relic of obsolete English debates that now turn toward supermajority.
In Supreme Court cases regarding the Louisiana rule, originally , the court has said the USA requires states to provide impartiality rather than unanimity. Supermajority is impartial to both conviction and acquittal. The USA upheld the rule. Further, with one juror committed to bias, supermajority is required and with 2 biased jurors, is required—again, theoretically. In an age with increasingly accurate crime forensics, civic impartiality seems divergent: bias among inhabitants is high.
Federalist #10 - James Madison - Federalist Fridays
YES 7….. I hope this table of various super-majorities with a jury of 12 comes out as I see it now.
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The mathematics is easy from column one to column two. For example, viewing the fourth row, with 12 jurors, one of whom is firmly biased, an impartial verdict is impossible.